“Borders are scratched across the hearts of
men
By
strangers with a calm judicial pen
And when the borders bleed, we watch with
dread
The lines of ink across the map turn
red”
Murya Manues
In 2017, the Doklam plateau became a
flashpoint for the Asian powers, India and China. China’s tactics in Doklam are
clear examples of its general “salami-slicing” strategy, a policy of gradual
encroachment onto disputed territory where other claimants are forced to accede
to a new status quo tilted in China’s favor. There is a geographical and
geopolitical scenario ongoing on Sino-Indian stand-off in the Doklam region.
Geographically, Bhutan is on a sensitive area of the Himalayan belt. Its
history, small size has made it an element in the geopolitical contest between
India and China. The ongoing crisis has highlighted the question-mark where
actually that trijunction lies. Indian and Bhutanese maps show some 200 meters
south-east of Batang La, while the Chinese claim the place as Gipmochi which is
confused for Gyemochen (or Gamochen).
Doklam in Bhutan, also known as Doka La in
India and Donglang in China. It is the small area of 90 square kilometers
becoming a crux point of geopolitics for India and China and a new Eurasian War
theatre. Doklam plateau located in Bhutan to the North of India (Sikkim), Bhutan
and China (Tibet) tri junction, juxtapose to Narrow Chumbi valley. Doklam
plateau is a disputed territory between Bhutan and China, both tried to resolve
the dispute, but failed to turn out to a mutually agreeable outcome. Pertaining
to disputed Doklam, China and Bhutan had two agreements in 1988 and 1998, which
permits them to maintain status quo as before 1959 case. While India and Bhutan
accorded a treaty, by which India may control the defense and foreign affairs
of Bhutan. When china transgressed into Doklam, India stepped in on behalf of
Bhutan and stopped the Chinese attempts of road construction, in retaliation
china destroyed the bunkers of Indian army and prevented the Indian Kailash Man
Sarovar pilgrims to pass through Nathu La pass.
India’s Geopolitical strategies in
Doklam
India’s control of Doklam will facilitates
easy transport of its military supplies to its different north eastern army
camps. India can further its diplomatic relations with Bhutan, and check’s
Chinese presence in Bhutan. Siliguri corridor also known as Chicken’s neck - a
narrow stretch of land located in North West Bengal, which connects North
eastern India to rest of India, which is a sensitive and high secure zone of
India. The same shall be safeguarded against Chinese aggression by strong
Indian presence in Doklam. India by curbing china at Doklam can send a strong
signal across the globe, particularly to South East Asian countries, in how to
defend china’s aggressive unilateralism by a holistic military and strategic
policy. India decisively won the two encounters in 1967 at Nathu La and Cho La
against china, owing to its strategic topographic upper hand over china at key
ridge positions.
China’s Geopolitical strategies in Doklam
For China, which is intending to construct
a road through Doklam to Jampheri will overlook the Indian strategic advantage
of holding ridge lines and key mountains in the region. China’s links to
Jampheri will allow them get access to Jaldhaka hydroelectric project, which is
the bridge connecting India and Bhutan, thereby checking India’s presence in
Bhutan. China’s stronghold in Doklam will put pressure on India’s Chicken’s
neck (Siliguri corridor). China may also check Indian military and defense
supplies to its North eastern Indian army camps. Doklam under China’s control
will enhance china’s bargaining power with India at key global engagements,
which may compromise India’s security and strategic interests. China – Bhutan
may open diplomatic channel in the course of time, which may affect India –
Bhutan relations in the long run. China heavily investing in the Chumbi valley,
in the way of up gradation of rail and road infrastructure projects therefore,
controlling Doklam is imperative to safeguard the china’s investments.
India, China and the 2017 “Doklam 1.0”
Crisis
China uses its power and pursues an
aggressive approach to retain a strategic advantage over its neighbors in the
arena of border diplomacy. A clear guiding principle in this behavior is China’s
evaluation of its national interest. In the case of the Burma border, China
wished to secure its flank to focus on India in the Himalayas. In the case of
Bhutan, China wished to cajole a minor power that India seemed intent on using
as a buffer state. Evidently, by securing the first-mover advantage, China
intends to keep India on the back foot and focused on the apparent
vulnerability of its northern border, preventing India from pursuing closer
ties with Japan and the USA, or, for example, exploiting the Tibet issue.
Geographically, the Siliguri Corridor is
vulnerable to a Chinese threat. While the question of whether China can
overcome India’s forces in Sikkim, outflank them, or mount an air assault may
be conjectural, the so-called “Chicken’s Neck” at Siliguri is a threat in
being. Some military leaders in India have downplayed the potential of the
Chinese threat because of the strength of India’s defensive posture. This is a
tactical viewpoint and discounts the permanency of the strategic
advantage.
The genuine risk that the corridor could be
severed, potentially cutting lines of communication to India’s North-East, is a
constant political threat that gives China a significant pressure point on India’s
leadership. The question of which India’s neighbor is in Doklam, and whether
this neighbor is hostile or friendly is, therefore, key to India’s national
interest.
Doklam 2.0
At Doklam, China has indeed halted further
construction towards Doka La via the earlier alignment. Construction a few
hundred meters to the rear and few kilometers to the east, directed towards the
Torsa Nala, seems to have sped up and tended towards permanent deployments. The
primary reason for India’s entry into the Doklam area was the issue of Chinese
military aggression in a disputed territory of strategic importance. Despite
major concessions having been made by the Indian side, no tangible benefits
have accrued from China on other fronts as well.
History is unlikely to be kind to the
political attitude adopted by the Indian government on Doklam. It is good to
understand that the build-up in Doklam 2.0 could not have been contested
militarily and should be dealt with diplomatically. However, it is also an
issue that should not be concealed from the public and prevaricated upon in
Parliament, unless there are compelling reasons of national interest to do so.
One possible explanation is that India’s
new attitude merely reflects an understanding of ground realities, not merely
in Doklam but also in the broader sense that China is far more powerful in
economic and military terms. While China is undoubtedly ahead in absolute
terms, in contextual and relative terms, they do not have an upper edge over
India.
The adopted strategy of absolute silence in
the face of military aggression in the disputed territory where Indian national
security interests are at stake is short-sighted in the extreme. It betrays
several of India’s long-term interests in the name of buying peace and
receiving unreliable assurances from China. A stance of “anticipatory
compliance” where India toes China’s line on all matters in the hope of border tranquility
serves only to weaken its negotiating power on other critical issues. Despite China’s
claims of seeking cooperation and closer economic ties with India – which, at a
politico-strategic level, maybe pure – it should also be recognized that China
is and will remain a strategic competitor in India’s neighborhood.
By Zavizah.
By Zavizah.
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